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Abstract—Proximity-based social applications let users interact
with people that are currently close to them, by revealing
some information about their preferences and whereabouts. This
information is acquired through passive geo-localisation and used
to build a sense of serendipitous discovery of people, places and
interests. Unfortunately, while this class of applications opens
different interactions possibilities for people in urban settings,
obtaining access to certain identity information could lead a
possible privacy attacker to identify and follow a user in their
movements in a specific period of time. The same information
shared through the platform could also help an attacker to link
the victim’s online profiles to physical identities. We analyse
a set of popular dating application that shares users relative
distances within a certain radius and show how, by using the
information shared on these platforms, it is possible to formalise
a multilateration attack, able to identify the user actual position.
The same attack can also be used to follow a user in all their
movements within a certain period of time, therefore identifying
their habits and Points of Interest across the city. Furthermore
we introduce a social attack which uses common Facebook likes
to profile a person and finally identify their real identity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The communication possibilities opened by online services
are almost endless. Social media allow people everyday to
know more about themselves, their friends and their sur-
rounding. To use such services, users grant them a certain
level of access to their private data. This data include details
about their identity, their whereabouts and in some situations
even the company they work for. This level of access is
obtained leveraging on third parties, like Facebook or Google,
which offer login technologies, allowing the application to
identify the user and receive precise information about them.
Once the user grant access to their data, the application
stores it and assumes control over how it is further shared.
The user will never be notified again on who is accessing
their data, nor if these are transferred to third parties. We
believe this can expose users of such services to privacy
attacks, while in addition preventing them to retain direct
control over their data and who has access to it over time.
This aspect of privacy protection is particularly relevant since
usually the right to privacy is interpreted as the user’s right
to prevent information disclosure. Online services use this
interpretation to ask the user to access certain information,
yet no concrete information is passed on how the data will be
used or stored. Furthermore, these services are often designed
as mobile applications where all the devices installing the
app communicate with a centralised server and constantly
exchange users’ information, eventually allowing for unknown
third parties, or potential attackers, to fetch and store this
data. In addition, this information is often shared with insecure
communication through the HTTP protocol, making it possible
for a malicious entity to intercept these communication and
steal user data.
A. Contribution
We have observed how proximity-based social applications
have access to certain identity information that could lead a
possible privacy attacker to easily identify users and link their
online profiles to physical identities. In our study we analyse
a set of popular dating application, which are built on the
assumption that users can preserve a certain level of privacy
by only sharing their relative distance with other users on the
platform. Furthermore the user also shares Facebook likes or
common categories of interests.
These application are built on the notion of serendipitous
discovery of people, places and interests around the user’s
surrounding.
We consider these applications an example of how many
privacy violation users are subjected to without being aware
of it. Furthermore, this scenario offers a playground to prove
how little details about the user’s whereabouts and personal
sensitive information are needed to track the user and discover
their real identities. For example we prove how the user’s
relative distance or their first name and what common interest
their share on Facebook, can allow an attacker to follow them
along the day and across their movements, or even profile
their full interests and discover personal details about them.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
1) We classify privacy threats in these applications
following the categorisation of Daniel J. Solove in [1],
which presenting a taxonomy to understand privacy
violations and to identify privacy problems in a
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comprehensive and concrete manner.
2) We formalise an attack showing how proximity based
social application are inherently insecure. Our attack
retrieves information about nearby users, stores certain
information about them, and subsequently uses these
to retrieve their updated profiles at regular intervals.
Our attacker agent is also able to change their relative
position at will and therefore can easily perform a
multilateration attack and identify the victim position
with a arbitrary precision. Furthermore the attacker can
keep following the user, eventually categorising their
interests, movements and even identifying their Points
of Interest (POI) around the city.
3) We build a Social Graph attack using Facebook likes to
know the victim interests. The applications examined,
in fact, allow the attacker to know what they have in
common with the victim and use the known expressed
interests to identify the user’s Facebook profile through
their Graph Search while also profiling individuals
nearby.
II. BACKGROUND
Online communications in general and social media in
particular, are increasingly opening up new possibilities for
users to share and interact with people and content online.
At the same time, social networking services collect and
share valuable information regarding locations, browsing
habits, communication records, health information, financial
information, and general preferences regarding user online
and offline activities. This level of access is often directly
granted from the user of such services, although the privacy
and sensitiveness of the information becoming accessible to
third parties can be easily overlooked.
Furthermore, social network are no longer a novelty
and user have become used to share their information with
both social relationships as well as third party applications.
Leveraging on this perception of social media by Internet
users, another class of applications is being developed based
on the concept of serendipitous discoveries. The idea
of serendipity in mobile applications wants the user to
accidentally discover people, places and/or interests around
them, by using passive geo-localisation and recommendation
systems. Passive geo-localisation is a mechanism using the
ability of mobile devices to know the user’s position without
having to constantly asking for it. Technologies that provide
this capability are GPS, wireless and mobile networks,
iBeacon and so on.
To present the user with a tailored and seamless experience,
serendipity applications need to learn the user’s preferences
and interests. This is usually accomplished by connecting
several of the user’s identities on other social networks.
A typical example is asking the user to register onto an
application through their Facebook, Twitter, or Google+
accounts. This technique usually consists in a variant of the
OAuth2.0 protocol used to confirm a person’s identity and
to control what data they will share with the application
requesting login.
We have specifically analysed Facebook login since it
was the common login mechanism offered in all applications
examined, although the same functionalities apply for other
third party login mechanisms. Facebook login provides both
authentication and authorisation. The mechanism is used on
the web as well as on iOS and Android, although on those
platforms the primary mechanism uses the native Facebook
application instead of the web API.
When an application is connected to the user’s Facebook
profile using Facebook Login, it can always access their
public profile information. Facebook consider this information
public and will not apply any restriction on it. Information
that is shared with the public profile vary from user to
user and depends on their privacy settings. By default the
Facebook public profile includes some basic attributes about
the person such as the user’s age range, language and country,
but also the name, gender, username and user ID (account
number), profile picture, cover photo and networks.
An application may also ask for more information about the
user. These can include the list of friends using the app, their
email, the events that they are attending, their hometown or
the things they have liked. This information can be obtained
by requesting for optional permissions, which are asked
for during login process. Apps can also ask for additional
permissions later, after a person has logged in.
The information obtained from Facebook is often displayed
on the application platform or used to match people with
similar interests, thus giving away more hints about an
individual real identity. For example a user swiping through
other people on Tinder [2] will know if they have liked
similar pages on Facebook. These hints or traces can be used
to further identify that individual on other platforms. In fact,
this information crossed with the city the user lives in, the
user’s photo, and their first name could already be enough to
identify their Facebook profile.
The attacker could hence use what they know about
the user to identify a number of profiles of people living in a
certain city. A query of the form people named John who live
in Barcelona and like surfing and volleyball could be used
to restrict the attacker’s search space to a smaller number of
profiles. Finally, since these applications tend to fetch the
profile photo directly from Facebook, the actual user profile
can be identified by matching the two profile pictures.
Notice that while some queries might seem very generic,
some others might already restrict significantly the set of
targeted profiles. It is particularly concerning in fact that these
applications might be used to target specific individuals with
the objective to reach confidential information about their
actual job or company they work for, as reported recently by
IBM in a report about security of dating apps [3].
The ubiquitous streams of data that users create while
they use different application can be seen as a network of
interconnected data snippets. Information shared on the web
can be linked together so that it is possible to construct
semantic connections between user’s activity data. A possible
attacker could therefore try to link data between different
source of information to identify and target users both online
and offline. Users become more frequently exposed to social
engineering attacks that can now leverage on facts gathered
online about their personal offline lives.
A. State of the art
Users of Social networks should be particularly careful
with the information they share on Social Network, as it
has been show how leaking bits of personal information can
be used for concrete privacy attacks. For example, physical
identification and password recovery attacks can be based
on the knowledge of personal information or the use of a
known secret [4]. It has been shown how the attribute set
birth-date, gender, zip code poses concrete risks of individual
identification [5], leading to details that can be used to
identify physical persons or to infer answers to password
recovery questions.
Another important aspect to consider is that the average
online user joins different social networks with the objective
to enjoy distinct services and features. On each service or
application an identity gets created, containing personal
details, preferences, generated content and a network of
relationships. The set of attributes used to describe these
identities is often unique to the user. In addition application or
services sometimes require the disclosure of different personal
information, such as email or full name, to create a profile.
Users possessing different identities on different services,
often use those to verify another identity on a particular
application, i.e. a user will use their Facebook and LinkedIN
profile to verify their account on the third service [6]. A set
of information required by one service could, in fact, add
credibility to the information the user has provided for a
second application, by demonstrating that certain personal
details overlap, and by adding other information, like, for
example, a set of shared social relationships.
Users online footprints could therefore be reconstructed
by combining the publicly available information provided
to different services [7] [8]. A possible attacker could start
by identifying common pseudonym, i.e. a username that
users often use across different social networks, then goes
on measuring how many possible profiles it can find across
different services. Therefore, a user’s activity on one site
can implicitly reveal their identity onto another site, also
investigating how locations attached to posts could be used
uniquely to identify a profile among a certain number of
similar candidates.
The analysis of publicly available attributes in public profiles,
shows a correlation between the amount of information
revealed in social network profiles, specific occupations or
job titles and use of pseudonyms. It is possible to identify
certain patterns regarding how and when users reveal precise
information [9]. Finally, aggregating this information can
lead an attacker to obtain direct contact information by cross-
linking the obtained features with other publicly available
sources, such, for example, online phone directories.
A famous method for information correlation was presented
by Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross [10]. Leveraging on
the correlation between individuals’ Social Security numbers
and their birth data, they were able to infer people Social
Security numbers by using only publicly available information.
Privacy attackers can also exploit loose privacy settings
of a user’s online social connections, taking advantage of how
humans interpret messages and interact with one another [15],
developing semantic attacks [14].
Therefore, mechanism helping to promote coordinated privacy
policies could be more efficient to count attacks [13].
Accurate coordinated policy could also warn users of
which third party application they authorise to access their
data. Social networking platforms, in fact, expose users’
privacy to possible attacks by allowing third party application
that access their data to be able to replicate it.
Sandboxing techniques could be implemented allowing users
to share information among social relationships, while also
helping third party application to securely aggregate data
according to differential privacy properties [16].
Users should be allowed to choose an appropriate level
of privacy for their needs and should be made aware of
unwanted access to their data. This would permit protection of
personal information that is being collected by mobile devices,
including the derived inferences that could be drawn from
the data. Semantic Web technologies can be implemented
to specify high-level, declarative policies describing user
information sharing preferences [17].
Users, in fact, consider three main deciding factors when
consulted about how and to what extent they are willing
to disclose personal and sensitive information, especially
information about their location, to social relations [18]. These
factors were: who was requesting a particular information,
why that information was requested, and what level of detail
would be most useful to the requester.
This aspect of users’ perception of sensitive information
disclosure is particularly relevant when it has been shown [19]
that knowing a user location is used as a grounding mechanism
in applications that lets users interact with their nearby. Geo-
tagged information set the basis for a platform for honest and
truthful signals in the process of forming new social relations.
At the same time, geo-localised information attached to users’
activities can be used, by an attacker, to derive models of
user mobility and provide data for context-aware applications
and recommendation systems [11]. This information can also
be used to cluster communities with different preferences and
interests into different geographical communities [12].
Also, while some social networking applications use
some form of obfuscation of the users’ actual positions,
precise location information can be still be derived. An
attacker could use the partial information to identify a user’s
real position even when their exact coordinates are hidden or
obfuscated by various location hiding techniques [?].
Therefore, we consider the problem of identifying the
geographical position of a node in a network given their
imprecise relative distance. This particular problem has being
studied extensively in the literature of wireless and sensors
networks.
Geometric relations among distances between nodes can
be formulated as equality constraints [20]. This approach
is used to study the localisation problem with imprecise
distance information in sensor networks. The error in the
inaccurate distances between sensor nodes and anchor nodes
starting is estimated from a set of algebraic constraints. The
problem is formulated as a least squares problem with the
objective to minimise the sum of the squared errors. Other
objective functions are also adoptable depending on the
specific application context.
Estimating the location of a node is also possible in
situation where their distance, or distance measurement, is
known with a relatively poor precision. A node of a randomly
placed wireless sensor network can, in fact, be accurately
track and targeted even with poor distance measurement
accuracy [21].
An attacker could also compromise a number of nodes
in a network to verify, or disclose, the position of a particular
node. In this particular scenario, n entity, the prover, claims
and wishes to prove its location. On the other side a different
entity, the verifier, has the role of verifying such location
claim. The verifier measure the distance to the prover and
can approve or not the claim that the prover must be must
be within a circle of a certain radius. By using an arbitrary
number of verifier at the same time, the actual location of the
prover is determined [22].
III. CLASSIFYING PRIVACY VIOLATIONS
We follow the approach of Daniel J. Solove in [1] to
classify privacy violations in four main categories (Table I).
These are:
1) Information collection
2) Information processing
3) Information dissemination
4) Invasion
A. Information collection
Information collection results from activities such as surveil-
lance, interrogation or information probing. It refers to actions
aimed at watching, reading, listening, recording of individual
activities or data about activities. It also refers to direct
questioning of individuals or inference of information from
data about them.
B. Information processing
Information processing concerns the aggregation and iden-
tification of data. Failure to provide data security and the
possibility for users to know who has accessed their data. This
also includes secondary use of data to which the user has not
been informed.
C. Information dissemination
Information dissemination includes activity such as breach
of confidentiality, unwanted disclosure and exposure of infor-
mation. This also includes increased accessibility to individ-
ual’s information, appropriation and distortion of data about
people. Information dissemination defines the very action of
breaking the promise of keeping information confidential. It
therefore implies actions aimed at the revelation of information
about an individual that can change the image of that person
within a group, including appropriation of identity information
and dissemination of false or misleading facts.
D. Invasion
Invasion is the threat of intrusion of an entity into someone’s
private life and it includes acts that are said to disturb one’s
tranquillity or solitude.
IV. MODELLING THE LOCATION PROBE METHOD
Proximity based social application collect users’ positions
and share their relative distances. We show how it is possible
to build a multilateration attack able to identify the actual
user position with arbitrary precision.
Multilateration is a navigation technique, often used in
radio navigation systems, based on the measurement of the
difference in distance to two or more stations, whose locations
are known. The stations also produce a certain signal at a
known time.
In our scenario, the signal is replaced by the user distance
from the attacker and time is given by the timestamp of the
user latest activity.
Please note that, multilateration is not concerned with
measurements of absolute distance or angle between parties,
but with measuring the difference in distance between two
stations which results in an infinite number of locations that
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF PRIVACY VIOLATIONS
Violation Activities Actions
Collection Surveillance; Information probing; Interro-
gation
Watching, listening, recording of individuals activities. Questioning individual directly.
Inferring information from data.
Processing Aggregation; Identification; Insecurity; Sec-
ondary use; Exclusion;
Gathering of data about individuals. Identification of physical identities from online data.
Carelessness in protecting data. Failure in allowing users to know who has accessed to their
data.
Dissemination Breach of confidentiality; Disclosure; Expo-
sure; Increased accessibility; Appropriation;
Distortion;
Breaking the promise of keeping the information confidential. Revelation of information
about an individual that impacts the way other see them. Appropriation of identity
information. Dissemination of false or misleading information. Transfer of personal data
to third party or threat to do so.
Invasion Intrusion of someone’s private life Acts that can disturb one’s tranquillity or solitude.
The table summarises the classification used to categorise privacy violation in proximity-based social application.
satisfy the measurement. All these possible locations form a
hyperbolic curve. Multilateration therefore relies on multiple
measurements to locate the exact location along that curve.
In fact, a second measurement taken to a different pair of
stations will produce a second curve, which intersects with
the first. When the two curves are compared, a small number
of possible locations are revealed.
If the attacher is able to retrieve an arbitrary number
of samples of the user distance, either by changing their
relative location or by sampling their distance with the victim
with a number of malicious mobile client infiltrating the
platform, the multilateration attack can be made arbitrary
precise.
Our location probe method uses a simple multilateration
algorithm. At the first step, locations expressed as longitude
and latitude coordinates are translated to cartesian coordinates.
We then calculate the estimated distance and minimise the
linear norm between calculated distance and estimated
distance by sensing the total error. We could have considered
the total squared error between the estimated and actual
distance, however in this paper we have concentrated on
demonstrating that the attack is actually feasible, rather then
on accuracy or performance of the algorithm (Fig. 1).
V. MODELLING THE USER ACTIVITY PROFILE
We model the user’s activity as series of events belonging
to a certain identity. Each event is a document containing
different information. We can formally defined this an
hypermedia document i.e. an object possibly containing
graphics, audio, video, plain text and hyperlinks. We call
the hyperlinks selectors and we use these to build the
connections between the user’s different identities or events.
Each identity is a profile that the user has created onto a
service or platform. This can be an application account or a
social network account, such as their LinkedIn or Facebook
unique IDs.
Fig. 1. The image illustrates the time needed to compute a user position
estimation based on the number of distance samples and the number of
iterations of the algorithm. It is important to note how the number of
distance samples does not affect the algorithm performances. The example
was executed on a Apple Computer with 3 GHz Intel Core i7 Processor.
Each event is the result of the user performing an action.
For the purpose of this study we have consider an action
as resulting using an application or a service. An action is
the activity of interacting with a mobile application or liking
a resource on a social network, i.e. directly expressing an
interest, or the fact that a user has updated their location at a
certain time.
Formally it is possible to model the graph of the events
pertaining to a user as an hypergraph, where each edge
can connect any number of vertices, and the root is first
event in the series. A hypergraph H is a pair H = (X,E)
where X is a set of nodes (the events in the model), and
E is a set of non-empty subsets of X called hyperedges or
edges. Hypergraphs are a generalisation of a graph structure
and provide a reasonable representation of the connections
between the different events resulting of the actions performed
by the user.
We find that this model is able to express the user’s
online footprint as a collection of traces left across different
services. Furthermore by using a hypergraph model we are
able to grasp the connections between the different profiles
and features.
This results in the possibility to profile users based on chosen
selectors. For example we might want to trace all users who
have been in the radius of 500 meters to a certain location, or
all the users in a certain neighbourhood who like a selected
Facebook page.
A. Adversary model
In view of the assumptions described in the previous section,
our privacy attacker boils down to an entity that aims to
identify users and link their online profile to their physical
identity. To achieve this objective the attacker posses a Face-
book profile. This profile is used in the first place to register
to the application analysed in this study since all three use
Facebook Login as a personalised way for user to register and
sign in.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have analysed 250 users from a set of social proximity
applications (Table II). All applications examined are match-
making mobile platforms which uses geolocation technology.
Users can use their location and preferences to search for
interesting people in a specific radius. All applications use
Facebook profiles to allow their users to login but also to
gather basic information and analyse users’ social graph.
The information collected are then used to match candidates
who are most likely to be compatible based on geographical
location, number of mutual friends, and common interests.
These applications present the user with the possibility to
interact with other users by starting conversation or expressing
their interests in them.
A. Information collection
Information collection is possible on these applications
through different techniques. For the purpose of this study
we have intercepted APIs call from mobile devices through
Men In The Middle (MITM) attack in some occasions, and
interacted with the APIs directly in other occasions. It is
important to note that even when the application prevents an
attacker from exploiting their APIs, a malicious entity could
still use a multitude of profiles to cross gather information
about users on the platforms.
B. Information processing
We have performed two types of attack on the set of
application examined, namely a multilateration attack and a
social graph attack.
Fig. 2. The image illustrates location samples with radii used to compute
actual position estimation for one user across the city of Barcelona, Spain.
1) Multilateration attack: Once we posses the user’s id on
the specific application we are able to query their APIs and
update our information about the user constantly. Furthermore
we are also able to change our own location on the platform
to a certain extent. By measuring the relative distance to the
victim we were able to identify their actual position with
arbitrary precision. Furthermore, the same technique was used
to follow users across a specific amount of time by retrieving
their profile information at regular interval. This type of attacks
can be easily overlooked in densely populated cities but might
become a serious privacy breach in rural areas.
2) Hyper graph attack: The application examined for
the scope of this study use the user’s Facebook token to
authenticate and/or authorise the application to request and
obtain certain information about the user. An attacker could
then use their own Facebook profile token to make request
to the application server through their APIs, pretending to
send the request from the app installed in a mobile device.
This allows the attacker to receive all the information that
users have shared with the platform and that are constantly
exchanged with the application.
When the victim’s Facebook id is shared through the
application, the attacker can directly access and potentially
use information publicly shared through the Facebook profile.
In this situation the attacker could easily construct a complete
graph of the user’s preferences and social connections through
the information that are public available through Facebook
APIs.
When the victim’s Facebook id is not directly shared,
the application still disclose some information about the
victim. This information include: the user first name and a
set of photos, birthdate, randomised in a range of 15 days,
and the Facebook pages that both the victim and the attacker
have liked.
The victim preferences could then be used to identifies
their Facebook profile. It is in fact estimated that Facebook
TABLE II
INFORMATION REGARDING THE APPLICATIONS ANALYSED
Application Users Facebook ID Location Distance User Pref. Full Name Birthdate Allow user tracking
Tinder [2] 10 Million active [23] 7 (1) 7 3 3 7 (2) 7 (3) 3
Happn [24] 700.000 [25] 3 (1) 7 3 3 7 (2) 7 3
Lovoo [26] 24 Million registered [27] 7 (1) 7 3 3 7 (2) 7 3
Grinder [28] 2,35 Million active [29] 7 (1) 7 7 3 7 7 7
Badoo [30] 200 million registered [31] 7 (1) 7 3(4) 3 7 (2) 7 3 (6)
(1) Facebook ID is not exposed directly but it can be identified by crossing information like the user Facebook’s likes, first name and year of birth.
(2) Only first name is shared.
(3) A fuzzy birthdate randomised in a range of two weeks is used. Real birthdate can be inferred by using Facebook Graph Search, depending on the
victim’s Facebook privacy settings.
(4) Offers option not to share distance.
(5) Asks for zodiac sign.
(6) Distance is shared for some users so it is theoretically possible.
posses 1.35 billion active users, of these, between 10%
and 7% like one of the top 10 Facebook pages with most
likes [32]. We have collected a set of 250 Tinder users only
in the city of Barcelona, of these 20% where sharing at least
one interest with the attacker profile (Fig. 3).
Furthermore Facebook graph search allows any users to
answer certain information about Facebook profiles. An
example of a graph search on Facebook could be: People
who like Shakira and are named ”John” and like Manchester
United and been born in 1979. This will create a pool
of potential candidates. The list can be reduced by using
Facebook reverse graph search, i.e. search for Interests liked
by people who like Shakira and are named ”John” and like
Manchester United and been born in 1979. This will instead
return a list of interests that the attacker can like on Facebook.
Therefore the attacker will return to query Tinder and find
out if the number of interests in common with the victim
has grown and which pages they now have in common. The
attacker can therefore use the new information to further
identify the victim profile on Facebook and potentially their
friends (Fig. 4).
It is important to note that some applications might
request information outside of Facebook public profile.
Therefore even if the victim has tailored their privacy settings
to prevent some information to be leaked, the application
can be used to access data that would be otherwise be kept
private.
C. Information dissemination
Proximity-based social applications, in their current imple-
mentation, represent a gateway to access data about individu-
als. Information dissemination can therefore be accomplished
both for large group of people with the purpose of targeting
them, as well as for specific victims. Identifying and disclosing
the presence of a certain person on a match making application
Fig. 3. The image shows how it is possible to show connections for the
population of users on Tinder for a certain area. Here we have collected
Facebook pages liked by users in Barcelona and connected users or group of
users, if they like the same page.
could be enough to influence the opinion of that individual
among their social relationships.
D. Invasion
Once a user location has being inferred, we can continue
tracking the same users and their preferences for an unlimited
amount of fetches. This could easily lead to identification of
the user habit and whereabout at different moment of the day,
possibly uncovering their home and work locations and more
information about the user.
VII. MITIGATION POSSIBILITIES
Application developers could implement a number of tech-
niques that would mitigate the actions of a possible attacker.
Fig. 4. The image represents a Social Graph attack where an attacker sends
queries Facebook asking question about a Tinder profile. The attacker is able
to restrict the pool of potential candidates and eventually identify the victim’s
actual Facebook id. Furthermore the attacker is able to store information
about the user that can be updated at a later time by querying the third party
application.
Firstly, in their current implementation, the applications ex-
amined probe the user device for location information with
the maximum precision possible. This information is then
transferred to the server and the relative distance between users
is returned to be displayed. Yet, for most of the application
functionalities this precision is not needed, and a lower pre-
cision could be used and sent to the server. This would make
position attacks more difficult to perform.
Secondly, to sparkle interest between users, social proximity
application often share common Facebook pages between
parties involved. This information can then be used to easily
identify unique Facebook accounts. Instead, the app could opt
to display only the category of interest to which the Facebook
page belongs. This way a possible attacker would not know
what actual pages the user has liked.
Thirdly, an individual birthdate if combined with their location
and first and/or last name can be used to infer sensitive
information about them. Therefore even sharing the user’s
zodiac sign with passive observer need to be considered
potentially dangerous for the final user’s privacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A new class of social application uses the users’ actual
location to provide personalised recommendation and allow
for new interactions especially in urban settings. We have
shown how these applications can expose their users to
different privacy attacks that can be easily overlooked.
We have analysed a set of popular dating application, and
observed how proximity-based social applications have access
to certain identity information that could lead a possible
privacy attacker to easily identify users on Facebook and link
their online profiles to physical identities.
Furthermore we have shown how users constantly sharing
their relative distance to other users can be followed by
an attacker in their movement without their knowledge. We
have demonstrated how this information can be used for a
multilateration attack with arbitrary precision. There is in
fact no restriction to the number of distance samples that a
possible attacker might be able to measure.
We followed a formal framework to identify the classes of
privacy violation to which users are subjected to without
being aware of it and we have shown how these violations
can all be carried out for the applications examined.
This shows how using third party profiles to provide
access to a specific applications may cause a security honey
pot for a possible attacker.
We have also stressed how In order to make the registration
process easier, these applications often leverage on third
party services to provide a login mechanism, while at the
same time acquiring certain private information about their
new users. The third parties used are often services such as
Facebook or Google, and the information accessed concern
the public profile of the users on such platforms.
While this technique certainly allows people to quickly sign
up to an application and create a new profile, it also creates
different privacy threats for users of such services. Primarily,
it concerns who can gain access to such data and how
information shared with third parties can also be stored and
eventually transferred without the user explicit consent.
We have then used Facebook graph search to build a hyper
graph of the user identity starting from few information that
were shared through a third application. This shows how
each information can be used as a selector to further identify
a different piece of the whole user identity and can be used
to target the user in real life.
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